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Torture and Public Policy: Mohamed v. Jeppesen
Dataplan, Inc., Allows “Extraordinary Rendition”
Victims to Litigate Around State Secrets Doctrine
I. INTRODUCTION
In Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.,1 the Ninth Circuit
examined the state secrets doctrine as it relates to the War on Terror.
The plaintiffs, alleged victims of the Central Intelligence Agency’s
(“CIA”) “extraordinary rendition” program, sued the private
corporation providing logistical support for plaintiffs’ so-called
“torture flights”—shuttling prisoners from their home countries to
CIA “black site” prisons and other locations. The government
intervened before an answer had been filed and claimed that the case
must be dismissed on the pleadings as its very subject matter is a
state secret barred by Totten v. United States.2 Although the district
court agreed, the ruling was appealed and reversed by a unanimous
three-judge panel.3
On appeal, the court declined the government’s invitation to
extend the harsh Totten bar on all judicial remedies whenever a state
secret is implicated. Instead, it adopted the flexible evidentiary
framework presented in United States v. Reynolds4 allowing the case
to continue on remand as long as evidence that is truly a state secret
is not indispensable to a prima facie case or to a valid defense.5 The
Mohamed ruling will allow litigation to continue, for now, on
evidence amassed by the plaintiffs from publicly available sources.6

1. 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009). After this Note was written, the opinion was
amended and reissued by the same judge that wrote the original opinion. The new citation is
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2009). The amendments were
made to limit the language of some sweeping dicta in the first version of the opinion, but they
do not change the holding of the court nor any part of the case relevant to this Note.
2. 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
3. Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 997.
4. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
5. Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 1009.
6. Sources include public disclosures from repentant foreign governments who were
involved with the CIA and statements from a former Jeppesen employee. See Mohamed v.
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1130 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
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The problem with this outcome is that although it is favorable to
these litigants who admittedly have public sources, the next set of
alleged victims to torture may not be as lucky. This standard, in
tandem with an earlier Ninth Circuit case, thus creates a perverse
incentive for the government to curb all disclosures to the public in
order to insure their own immunity. 7
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Factual Background
1. Allegations of torture
All five plaintiffs allege torture, forced disappearances, and secret
incommunicado detention performed by U.S. agents or foreign
governments in concert with the CIA.8
a. Plaintiff Mohamed, an Ethiopian citizen and legal resident of
the United Kingdom, alleged that he was flown to Morocco, severely
beaten, and had his bones routinely broken.9 Interrogators allegedly
cut him with a scalpel from head to toe, “including his penis,” and
then poured “hot stinging liquid” into the wounds.10 He was then
transferred to a CIA “dark prison,” further tortured, deprived of
food, and for twenty-four hours a day kept in near-darkness and
subjected to loud noises like the screams of women and children.11
Mohamed spent the next five years at Guantanamo. During the
pendency of this appeal he was released to the United Kingdom
without being charged.12
b. Plaintiff Britel, an “Italian citizen of Moroccan origin,” was
transferred to American custody after his arrest for immigration law

7. If somehow the court could have found a standard that allowed revealing
government information notwithstanding the privilege, the perverse government incentive
would abate dramatically. Exactly how to do this is admittedly unclear and is not discussed in
this Note. It is merely meant to draw attention to this particular repercussion of the current
standard.
8. Plaintiffs allege that they were held in secret without counsel, consular agents, or
family knowing of their whereabouts, much less given access to them. See Complaint ¶¶ 3, 8,
104, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 072798), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/mohamed_complaint20070530.pdf.
9. Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 998.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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violations in Pakistan.13 Britel alleged that he was beaten, deprived of
food and sleep, and threatened with “sexual torture, including
sodomy with a bottle and castration.”14 He was released, then
detained again, coerced into signing a false confession, convicted,
and sentenced to serve fifteen years in a Moroccan prison.15
c. Plaintiff Agiza, an Egyptian citizen seeking asylum in Sweden,
alleged that he was captured by Swedish authorities and handed over
to U.S. agents who flew him to Egypt.16 He was there “severely and
repeatedly beaten” for five weeks while in a “squalid, windowless,
and frigid cell.”17 He was also placed on a wet mattress, with
electrodes on his “ear lobes, nipples and genitals,” and partially
electrocuted.18 Agiza spent two and a half years in detention before
being provided with a trial before a military court, convicted, and
sentenced to fifteen years in an Egyptian prison.19
d. Plaintiff Bashmilah, a Yemeni citizen, was in Jordan visiting his
infirm mother when he was detained by the Jordanian government.20
They allegedly physically and psychologically abused him, transferred
him to U.S. agents who flew him to Afghanistan, and placed him in
solitary confinement in twenty-four-hour darkness.21 Then he was
placed in “twenty-four-hour light and loud noise,” and shackled in
painful positions.22 He “attempted suicide three times.”23 Next, he
was flown to a “CIA ‘black site’ prison,” which had alternating white
noise and “deafeningly loud” music.24 In the end, he was tried for a
petty crime, “sentenced to time served abroad, and released.”25
e. The final plaintiff, al-Rawi, is an Iraqi citizen and has been a
legal resident of the United Kingdom since 1994. Al-Rawi was

13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 997.
Id. at 997–98.
Id. at 998.
Id. at 997; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, STATE OF DENIAL: EUROPE’S ROLE
IN RENDITION AND SECRET DETENTION 67 (2008), available at http://www.amnestyusa.
org/stoptorture/pdf/Europe%20renditions%20whole%20doc%20low%20res.pdf.
17. Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 997.
18. Id.; see also Complaint, supra note 8, at ¶ 145.
19. Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 997.
20. Id. at 998.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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traveling to Gambia on business when detained by the Gambian
Intelligence Agency and interrogated by U.S. CIA agents.26 He was
flown to Afghanistan, detained in the CIA “dark prison” where loud
noises played twenty-four hours a day, then flown “to Bagram Air
Base, where he was ‘subjected to humiliation, degradation, and
physical and psychological torture by U.S. officials.’”27 He was
beaten, threatened with death, and then shackled in “excruciating
pain” for his trip to Guantanamo.28 Finally, he was released and
returned to the United Kingdom, apparently without being
charged.29
2. Role of Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.
Each of the prisoner plaintiffs were allegedly transported
inhumanely to various prisons aboard a Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.,
(“Jeppesen”) flight. Preparation for each flight began with the
passengers being stripped naked, cavity searched, placed in a diaper,
covered by a hood and overalls, shackled in pain-positions, and
chained to a chair or stretcher.30 For every leg of these transfers,
Jeppesen, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Boeing,31 allegedly provided
the flight services and logistics.32
A former employee of Jeppesen, Sean Belcher, gave a sworn
declaration that Jeppesen apparently provided these services because
“‘the rendition flights paid very well.’”33 A supervisor told him, “We
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See id.; see also FRONTLINE/World Extraordinary Rendition: Interviews: Bisher alRawi, available at http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/rendition701/interviews/
bisher.html [hereinafter PBS] (transcript of interview with Plaintiff al-Rawi).
30. See Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 997–98; PBS, supra note 29, at 4–5; Complaint, supra
note 8, passim.
31. Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 997.
32. Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 11. The flight logistics allegedly entailed “pre-departure
flight planning services, including itinerary, route weather, and fuel plans for both aircraft
involved in their renditions.” Id. They “procured necessary landing and overflight permits for
all legs of the rendition flights; and through local agents, arranged fuel and ground handling
for the aircraft; filed flight plans with national and inter-governmental air traffic control
authorities; paid passenger fees for the crew; and made arrangements to secure the safety of the
aircraft and crew on the ground.” Id. It should be remembered though that Jeppesen is not
accused of actually torturing anyone. It is only accused that they “knew” or “should have
known” that people were going to be tortured and yet Jeppesen continued to aid and abet the
torturers with their logistics.
33. Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 999 n.1.
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do all the extraordinary rendition flights.”34 Belcher also testified that
“there were some employees who were not comfortable with that
aspect of Jeppesen’s business because they knew some of these flights
end up with the passengers being tortured.”35 However, Belcher
testified that his supervisor explained “that’s just the way it is, we’re
doing them.”36
B. Procedural History
1. Original complaint
Plaintiffs filed suit against Jeppesen under the Alien Tort Statute
(“ATS”),37 which allows foreign nationals to sue in U.S. courts for
torts in violation of U.S. treaties or gross violations of customary
international law.38 Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that Jeppesen
was either “actively participating” or “aiding and abetting” in the
“torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment” of the
plaintiffs by agents of the United States and allies in foreign
governments.39
Before Jeppesen filed an answer to the complaint, the United
States Government moved the court to intervene in the case, and at
the same time moved to dismiss the complaint.40 The government
asserted the state secrets privilege and gave two declarations from
then-CIA Director General Michael Hayden, satisfying the
procedural requirements of invoking the privilege.41 One statement
was redacted and public, while the other was classified and heard in

34. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
35. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
36. Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also Jane Mayer, Outsourcing: The C.I.A.’s
Travel Agent, NEW YORKER, Oct. 30, 2006, available at http://www.newyorker.com/
archive/2006/10/30/061030ta_talk_mayer.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
38. See Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 999; Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
39. Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 999. Torture has long been recognized as a violation of
customary international law, as would be aiding and abetting torture. Torture is also a violation
of several U.S. treaties. Therefore, the ATS appears to have been appropriately invoked. See
generally Robert Johnson, Extraordinary Rendition: A Wrong Without a Right, 43 U. RICH.
L. REV. 1135, 1157–60 (2009).
40. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1132–33 (N.D.
Cal. 2008). The motion to intervene was made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
24(a). Id.
41. Id. at 1134.
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camera. Plaintiffs objected to the dismissal of the case,42 but did not
oppose U.S. intervention.43
2. Ruling of the district court
The district court44 allowed the United States to intervene and
agreed with the government’s reasoning for dismissal.45 In granting
the motion to dismiss, the court found that the state secret doctrine
articulated in Reynolds barred this case from continuing.46 It
reasoned that “at the core of Plaintiffs’ case . . . are ‘allegations’ of
covert U.S. military or CIA operations in foreign countries against
foreign nationals [which are] clearly . . . state secret[s],” and thus
categorically barred from litigation.47
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND
The concept of a state secret is not new, but it does tend to be
developed only when we are at war. It first appeared in American
jurisprudence in Aaron Burr’s treason trial,48 and it was further
defined in the aftermath of the Civil War, the Cold War, and now
the War on Terror. The doctrine today is marked by “[t]wo parallel
strands”49 from two landmark Supreme Court cases, Totten v. United
States,50 and United States v. Reynolds.51 Various circuits have applied
the standards from these cases, including the Ninth Circuit.
A. Totten v. United States
In Totten, the estate of an alleged spy claimed the United States
had not adequately compensated him for espionage services rendered
during the Civil War.52 Allegedly, President Lincoln had
commissioned the spy to proceed south, ascertain the strength of the

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
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Id. at 1135–36.
Id. at 1133.
Northern District of California, Judge James Ware.
Mohamed, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1134–36.
See id. at 1136.
Id.
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 37 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d).
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 569 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2009).
Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
Totten, 92 U.S. at 105.
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Confederate Army, and “procure plans of forts and fortifications, and
gain such other information as might be beneficial to the
government of the United States,” for which he would be paid $200
a month.53 The Court of Claims found that he had in fact faithfully
performed his charge behind rebel lines during the entire period of
the war, but he had only been reimbursed for his expenses.54
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that such a contract for
espionage services should not even be litigated in a court of justice.55
The Court reasoned that public policy forbids the revelation of such
contracts, given the inevitable need for a detailed presentation of the
contract in order to sustain an action.56 Furthermore, any espionage
contract necessarily contains an implied covenant to never reveal its
existence, and such a covenant would be broken by merely bringing
suit.57
B. United States v. Reynolds
In Reynolds, three civilians were killed in a B-29 crash while on
“a highly secret mission of the Air Force,” testing secret electronic
equipment.58 The estates of the civilians asked the government to
produce a report to show the negligence of the military. The
government resisted, asserting that “it has been determined that it
would not be in the public interest to furnish this report.”59 The
district court ordered production of the documents to assess the
validity of the government’s claims, but the Air Force refused.60
Judgment was entered for plaintiffs and then affirmed at the court of
appeals.61
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the government was
allowed to assert the privilege and prevent the discovery of the
evidence.62 They reasoned that “[t]oo much judicial inquiry into the
53. Id. at 105–06.
54. Id. at 106.
55. Id. at 106–07.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 106 (“Both employer and agent must have understood that the lips of the
other were to be for ever sealed respecting the relation of either to the matter. This condition
of the engagement was implied from the nature of the employment.”).
58. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 2–4 (1953).
59. Id. at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. Id. at 5.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 10–12.
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claim of privilege would force disclosure of the thing the privilege
was meant to protect . . . .”63 The Court took “judicial notice that
this is a time of vigorous preparation for national defense . . . .
[T]hese electronic devices must be kept secret if their full military
advantage is to be exploited in the national interests.”64 But the
Court stated that after “a formal claim of privilege” has been lodged,
it is still for the judge to determine, in a manner that protects the
allegedly privileged information, whether the privilege is justified
given the circumstances of the case.65 The test proposed by the
Court is whether “there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of
the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of
national security, should not be divulged.”66 The necessity of the
information to the case should also be accounted for, though “even
the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of
privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at
stake.”67 In Reynolds, the Court found the government’s assertion
reasonable, particularly in light of “a dubious showing of
necessity.”68 The Court thus held that the district court erred when
it did not continue the case without the privileged reports.69
C. Kasza v. Browner
The Ninth Circuit most recently applied the state secrets
privilege in Kasza v. Browner.70 At first glance, the case looks like it
supports a Totten categorical bar to recovery, but in reality it follows
the Reynolds evidentiary framework. In Kasza, former workers of a
classified government factory sued the United States Air Force and
the Environmental Protection Agency for violating certain health
standards.71 However, “[o]nce discovery got underway, the Air Force
refused to furnish almost all of the information requested on the
ground that it was privileged.”72 The court did not bar discovery at

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

124

Id. at 8.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 8 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
Id.
See id. at 11–12.
Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1162.
Id. at 1163 (emphasis added).
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the outset, but once evidence that would be excludable under the
Reynolds state secrets test was unavailable, the plaintiffs essentially
lost all ability to litigate the case. The case was dismissed accordingly,
and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.73 Thus Kasza advocates
dismissing the complaint if, without inclusion of the privileged state
secrets evidence, a plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case, or,
alternatively, if the defendants would be deprived of an otherwise
valid defense.
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION
The Ninth Circuit in Mohamed found that the categorical Totten
bar applied by the district court, which wipes out all judicial remedies
when state secrets are central to a plaintiff’s claims, was too harsh a
standard.74 Instead, the court utilized the Reynolds case, which
provides a more flexible evidentiary approach that allows the case to
continue as long as individual pieces of evidence protected by the
state secrets privilege are not found to be indispensable to a prima
facie case or a valid defense.75 Finding that the case could proceed
under the Reynolds standard, the court remanded the cases for
further proceedings.
A. Totten Is Too Harsh
The government argued that Totten was a categorical bar to this
lawsuit because plaintiff’s claims were all premised on a secret
contract between Jeppesen and the government, much like the secret
contract between the spy and President Lincoln in Totten.76 The
court rejected this argument on several points. First, some of
plaintiff’s claims did not require proving the existence of a contract
between the government and Jeppesen.77 Plaintiffs might show only
knowledge that the passengers were going to be tortured in order to
prove liability. Second, Totten and its progeny are about plaintiffs
revealing their own secret relationships with the government.
Mohamed and his fellow plaintiffs are not seeking to reveal any sort
of agreement they themselves have entered. Thus they are not
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 1176.
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992, 1001–03 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1003–04.
Id. at 1001.
Id.
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breaking the Totten implied covenant that their own “lips [are] to be
forever sealed,” such that suing by itself defeats recovery.78 Third,
the language from Reynolds about Totten being a situation where the
“very subject matter” of the case involved a state secret was only in a
footnote and was not meant to be the foundation of a new
expanding doctrine.79 Declining to apply the Totten bar, the court
held that the case was wrongly dismissed under a supposed
categorical bar to recovery based on a “very subject matter” Totten
test.80
B. Reynolds Is a Balance of the Legitimate Interests
The court noted that there is a constitutional prerogative to
provide judicial review and to check the Executive.81 The Totten bar
completely abdicates this responsibility and gives an unhealthy
deference to the Executive’s determination of what is a state secret.
Throwing out the entire case thus creates a “winner-takes-all” bar to
recovery that is too crude an instrument for balancing the delicate
due process concerns with legitimate executive secrecy concerns.82
The Reynolds framework, on the other hand, has been approved by
analogous cases and reduces the “violence of the collision” between
the executive and judicial branches.83
The government argued that if the Reynolds framework were
adopted, the information in the secret evidence would still be
excludable because the information itself could be expected to harm
national security.84 The court pounced on this argument and
explained that information is never protected by an evidentiary
privilege.85 For example, the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination will not prevent the prosecution from using

78. Id. at 1002 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
79. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1,
11 (1953).
80. Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 1003–04.
81. Id. at 1003.
82. Id.
83. Id. “Unlike Totten, the Reynolds framework accommodates these division-of-powers
concerns . . . without categorically immunizing the CIA or its partners from judicial scrutiny.”
Id. at 1004.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1004–06.

126

DO NOT DELETE

117

3/6/2010 2:17 PM

Torture and Public Policy

incriminating information obtained from other evidence sources.86
Likewise, if the state secrets doctrine is properly invoked, it makes
that particular piece of evidence privileged.87 However, the case goes
on, and the information in that evidence is still discoverable from
other sources, “regardless whether privileged evidence might also be
probative of the truth or falsity of the [same information].”88
C. The Freedom of Information Act Standard Does Not
Work for “State Secrets”
The government tried to present arguments based on the
Freedom of Information Act89 (“FOIA”) case law, but the court
found them “unpersuasive.”90 The standard in FOIA cases for
determining exempt matters is simply to take the executive’s word
for it—if it has been deemed “classified” then it is “categorically
exempt from disclosures that would otherwise be required under the
Act.”91 Such a loose standard is not appropriate in the state secrets
context. It would give complete control over determination of what
qualifies under the privilege to the Executive Branch, “in plain
contravention” of the Reynolds admonition to not leave control of
evidence solely to the “‘caprice of executive officers.’”92

86. Id. at 1005. Similarly, just because some information was shared under an attorneyclient privilege does not mean parties cannot obtain that same information from another
source.
87. With the only effect that “‘the evidence is unavailable, as though a witness had died
[or a document had been destroyed], and the case will proceed accordingly, with no
consequences save those resulting from the loss of evidence.’” Id. at 1006 (quoting AlHaramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1204 (9th Cir. 2007) (alteration in
original)).
88. Id. at 1005.
89. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2009).
90. Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 1006.
91. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2009).
92. Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 1007 (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8–10
(1953)). The court was well informed of the “abuses” that could come from giving a classified
blank-check power to the executive, and in footnote 7 it catalogued a short history of
embarrassing situations deemed classified whenever they have nothing to do with national
security. The most embarrassing revelation was the accident report in Reynolds that the
Supreme Court granted the privilege for in 1953, which was recently declassified: it revealed a
shameful cover-up of missteps that led to those men’s deaths. It was in fact not a legitimate
state secret—yet it is the leading case on the doctrine.
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D. Conclusion—the Case Must Continue
Finally, the government argued a Kasza-style dismissal applies
because plaintiffs will not be able to bolster enough evidence for
even a prima facie case, assuming all the evidence would be deemed
privileged.93 The court dismissed this assertion as premature,
explaining, “we simply cannot prospectively evaluate hypothetical
claims of privilege that the government has not yet raised and the
district court has not yet considered.”94 The court remanded the
case, finding that the plaintiffs had successfully defeated a motion to
dismiss with their “well-pleaded complaint,”95 and ordered that
discovery proceed.
V. ANALYSIS
While Mohammed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., is a well-reasoned
opinion in the right direction, the case is problematic because it
creates a subtle incentive for government operations to become more
secretive. This Note argues that public policy should temper the state
secrets evidence privilege, and because “more secretive” government
operations are against public policy, a different standard from the
one articulated by the court should be considered in future cases.
A. There Is an Incentive To Be More Secretive
Even though the Mohamed opinion brings alleged victims of
inhumane treatment one step closer to actually litigating their claims,
only a certain type of plaintiff—“plaintiffs [that] can prove the
‘essential facts’ of their claims ‘without resort to [privileged
evidence]’”96—can pass the Reynolds hurdle that remains after the
pleadings.
This standard has yet to be applied to the plaintiffs in Mohamed
because they have not yet requested “specific evidence” against
which the government can formally invoke the privilege.97
Considering that the district court will be presiding when the
privilege is later brought forward in this case, and it has already

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

128

Id. at 1004.
Id. at 1008.
Id.; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
Mohamed, 563 F.3d. at 1001 (quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11).
Id. at 1009.
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determined that the classified information in the Hayden declaration
justifies the state secrets doctrine,98 it is fair to assume that if these
plaintiffs do not have outside evidence they will be later barred by
the Reynolds privilege.99 Nevertheless, the court seemed to take
comfort in the plaintiffs’ alleged ability to produce outside
information as an indication that this case would ultimately survive,
even if the Reynolds standard precluded classified evidence.100
However, what will happen to future victims that cannot find
outside information? They are still completely vulnerable to
dismissal, despite the good direction that Mohamed offers. The
prospect of dismissal naturally places an incentive on the government
not to disclose anything purposefully and to keep a tighter control
on the information that leaks out about its operations. In short, if
the government were able to create a true “black box,” it would
ensure its own immunity.101
This incentive to create greater secrecy reinforces the Ninth
Circuit’s earlier case on the state secrets doctrine, Al-Haramain
Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Bush.102 That case involved a suit brought
because of searches done by the Terrorist Surveillance Program
(“TSP”) without warrants. The opinion began by rehearsing the
government’s varied “spoon-fed” disclosures of the “contours” of
the program—disclosures voluntarily made by the government to
allay public concerns.103 The court seemed to chide the government’s
assumption that it could claim the state secrets privilege whenever it
had “moved affirmatively to engage in public discourse about the
TSP.”104 The court suggested that “[u]nlike a truly secret or ‘black

98. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1134 (N.D. Cal.
2008).
99. See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007). In El-Masri, the
facts are very similar to Mohamed. The plaintiff was a victim of the alleged “extraordinary
rendition” program, and both the district court and the Fourth Circuit held that the Reynolds
privilege applied after reading a classified statement from the CIA director. In contrast to
Mohamed, the court in El-Masri rejected the idea that public evidence could still be used to
prove information excluded by the Reynolds privilege.
100. See Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 997 (“Citing publicly available evidence,
plaintiffs . . . .”); id. at 998–99 (“According to plaintiffs, publicly available evidence establishes
that Jeppesen provided . . . .”).
101. See Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir.
2007).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1192–93.
104. Id. at 1193.
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box’ program that remains in the shadows of public knowledge,” the
government was preventing its own defense by trying to give some
kind of public awareness, even “[t]hough its operating parameters
remain murky.”105
The Ninth Circuit seems to be saying that the government
should not let even the “contours” of its programs be known if it
wants civil immunity. But the government commonly discloses the
contours of its secret programs106—perhaps so that Congress, and by
extension the people, can hold their government accountable.107
B. Evidentiary Rules Like the State Secrets Privilege Are
Public Policy Driven
The incentive for the government to be more and more secretive
is against public policy.108 Because public policy should be carefully
weighed when applying a rule of evidence like the state secrets
doctrine, the court should have taken it into consideration.109
First, “[t]he Supreme Court could not be clearer that [the state
secrets privilege] is a privilege within the law of evidence.”110

105. Id. at 1192–93.
106. Usually the public knows just the basic contours of secret programs because the
government is most interested in keeping the “operating parameters . . . murky.”
Id. at 1192–93; see, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1242 (4th Cir.
1985) (“The fact that this program exists is unclassified and is well known . . . [but w]hether
other such uses have developed from information obtained in the marine mammal program is a
classified fact about which no official release of information has ever been made.”);
Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 551 (2d Cir. 1991). The existence of
the Phalanx Anti-Missile System, and other systems on board the ship, were public knowledge.
However, “[d]esign, performance, and functional characteristics . . . are classified.” Id.
Consider also the present case, Mohamed, and the public knowledge of the basics of the
detention program; and consider the Al-Haramain case and public knowledge of the Terror
Surveillance Program.
107. See Redacted, Unclassified Brief for Intervenor-Appellee the United States, AlHaramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 08-15693),
2008 WL 4973859. “As General Hayden’s public declaration recognizes, the President has
made limited declassifications concerning the CIA terrorist detention and interrogation
program. Specifically, the President has publicly acknowledged that the program existed . . . .
The President made these limited disclosures in connection with his request to Congress to
enact legislation . . . .” Id. § C.
108. This may be especially true with programs involving torture. See infra Part V.C.
109. Perhaps the idea was dismissed for other reasons, namely, the perverse incentive is
unavoidable when choosing the better of two risk-fraught alternatives. But no mention is made
of considering it in the opinion.
110. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992, 1005 (9th Cir. 2009)
(quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1953)) (internal quotations omitted).
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Evidence law thus provides a good guide to how public policy
should govern this rule. In the Federal Rules of Evidence, certain
policy choices exclude probative evidence in order to avoid perverse
incentives.111 For instance, Rule 407 removes the perverse incentive
to not take remedial measures after an accident occurs (such as steps
to prevent its recurrence) because a jury might see those measures as
evidence of negligence. Rule 407 excludes evidence of remedial
efforts in litigation, thus removing the perverse incentive to do
nothing.
Also, the federal rules specifically allow courts to weigh public
policy concerns when dealing with privileges. Rule 501 says, “the
privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political
subdivision . . . may be interpreted by the courts . . . in the light of
reason and experience.”112 Allowing a court to use “reason and
experience” is a decision to allow courts to consider policy when
applying privileges like the attorney-client privilege or the state
secrets privilege.
Finally, it must not be forgotten that the state secrets doctrine
derives from the common law.113 It is not statutory, nor is it based in
the Constitution.114 Therefore, based on prevalent judicial principles,
the court of appeals is encouraged to seek out the full gamut of
policy concerns when applying the standard and is not bound to
apply precedent that is based on different circumstances and
policies.115

111. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 407–11. Each of these rules recognizes a perverse incentive
in litigation or a criminal matter that a Rule of Evidence has tried to fix.
112. FED. R. EVID. 501.
113. “The state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary privilege that allows the
government to deny discovery of military secrets.” Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1165
(9th Cir. 2008).
114. See Brief of Professors of Constitutional Law, Federal Jurisdiction, and Foreign
Relations Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Mohamed and Urging Reversal at 3–5, Mohamed
v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992 (No. 08-15693), 2008 WL 6042363.
115. The court in Mohamed recognized the role of public policy calculus in deciding legal
standards when discussing the FOIA. There the court saw one standard for FOIA claims and
another for state secret doctrine claims. Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 1006–08. The justification was
that a different mix of variables and policies went into the latter cases, thus requiring a different
legal standard. Id.
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C. Public Policy May be Different in Torture Cases
The idea of a state secret stemmed from the concept that some
secrets should not be revealed because the collective good of society
is safeguarded in their secrecy. To wit, society is safer if there are
legitimate clandestine activities.116 However, several considerations
show that torture is something different from a legitimate
clandestine activity.
For example, in case law developing the state secrets doctrine,
the greater good of society encouraged clandestine operations in the
Totten, Reynolds, and Kasza cases. Totten involved run-of-the-mill
war-time espionage, and the plaintiff wanted the government to pay
for espionage services rendered.117 Reynolds involved Air Force
technology, and if successful, the suit at most might have
encouraged the government to exercise a greater duty of care on its
planes.118 Kasza concerned naval technology, and if not dismissed by
application of the privilege, it would have encouraged the
government to follow environmental protocols more stringently.119
Torture, however, is of a much more serious nature than payroll
fraud, negligence, or regulatory compliance.
Torture is a subject of intense international discussion and much
scholarly writing and convincing the reader that it is unjustified
would be impossible in this simple Note.120 However, it seems
logical that the public policy calculus involved in allowing torture is
116. The archetypical example would be having spies at wartime. See Totten v. United
States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
117. Id.
118. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
119. Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2008).
120. From a broad standpoint, letting the government get away with torture, official
disappearances, and secret detention is in general a serious consideration for at least six reasons:
1) it encourages mistreatment in kind to our own soldiers and American citizens abroad; 2) it
is a scorched earth policy that discourages enemy surrender and defection; 3) it makes martyrs
of terrorists, galvanizes terrorism supporters in their ‘holy’ cause, and overall inflames preexisting hatred; 4) it erodes public confidence within the United States that our nation is one
governed by moral norms; 5) it erodes international confidence in the United States as a
country founded on moral constitutional principles worth emulating; and 6) because it is
reprehensible to our allies, it alienates even our closest friends from helping us in legitimate
anti-terrorist efforts. See generally Brief Amicus Curiae of Former United States Diplomat’s
Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. 563 F.3d
992 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-15693), 2008 WL 3845065. This brief makes a complete and
cogent argument on why the extraordinary rendition program should be stopped in order to
restore our damaged international image and regain the support of allies who find this practice
anathema to a free society.
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unique to torture. The formulation of a different standard is
prudent—especially when applying the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation
of the state secrets doctrine would allow the government to get away
with its more heinous operations just because it has limited all public
disclosure. And any future case, like Mohamed, that creates that
incentive by following old state secrets standards not calibrated for
torture should address this legitimate concern.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Mohamed opinion allows alleged victims of the CIA’s
extraordinary rendition program to clear one more hurdle in their
quest for justice in American courts. The Ninth Circuit made plain
that the state secrets doctrine does not protect government
defendants from information attainable outside of privileged
evidence, and state secrets “at the core” of a plaintiff’s case will not
necessarily bar recovery under the harsh Totten standard.121 Only
time will tell, however, if this is a true victory for those committed to
human rights because the opinion unmistakably creates a perverse
incentive for government operations to become even more secretive.
Michael P. Jensen

121. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2009).
 J.D. candidate, April 2010, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University. I would like to thank my wife, Ally, for putting up with many late nights at the law
school.
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